Reparation and egalitarian justice

Why looking back matters

Suppose a historic wrongdoing has left the victim deprived. Arguably, this generates a duty on the part of the wrongdoer to make reparation. At the same time, the victim’s deprivation generates a forward-looking duty to repair her situation. For example, considerations of equality and flourishing might require that we intervene on her behalf to get her back on even footing. In fact, those forward-looking considerations would generate a duty to repair her situation whether or not she was a victim of wrongdoing.

In political philosophy, there is a small literature examining this normative overlap–– the overlap between duties of repair grounded in backward-looking considerations (e.g., wrongdoing) and duties of repair grounded in forward-looking considerations (e.g., egalitarian justice). As some argue, the overlap renders backward-looking considerations redundant. To get at justice, it would suffice to look forward, consulting the demands of egalitarian justice. As Megan Blomfield puts it, the claim is this:

The redundancy thesis: For any true statement (Q) concerning our present-day claims and obligations of justice, appeals to forward-looking egalitarian justice considerations, along with some relevant statements of fact, are sufficient to establish Q. Forward looking egalitarian justice overdetermines reparative justice. Reparative justice then has no independent normative work to do.¹

Here are some quick responses.² To begin, consider that “normative work”/“normative significance” is vague. A consideration, C, might do normative work in the sense that it grounds remedial obligation, O. If I promise to meet you for coffee, I thereby have an obligation to do so. This seems to be the sense in which proponents of the redundancy thesis claim that backward-looking considerations have no independent normative significance.³ Backward-looking considerations do not ground any duties that aren’t already required by forward-looking considerations.⁴

However, consider that C can have normative significance beyond its function as the grounds of obligation. First, C might strengthen an obligation. Suppose meeting you for coffee would boost your moral in your season of depression; if I don’t show up, your seasonal blues will only worsen. This second consideration strengthens my obligation to meet you for coffee. Strengthening has a comparative dimension. When the morally relevant considerations pull in different directions, generating pro tanto obligations that conflict with each other, the obligation with the greatest strength becomes one’s all-things-considered obligation. Strengthening also has a critical dimension. Duty-bearers who shirk a duty are liable to greater critique as the strength of the duty goes up (all else being equal).

With that in mind, the redundancy thesis is true only if a corollary thesis is true:

Redundancy of strength thesis: For any duty of repair, D, appeals to forward-looking egalitarian considerations are sufficient to establish the strength of Q. Forward looking egalitarian justice overdetermines the strength of our obligations of justice.

This thesis is false. Suppose a family is financially vulnerable through no fault of their own. Unless they acquire $100, they will not be able to afford groceries for the week. If you are in a position to help them, at little cost to yourself, you ought to do so. However, suppose the family is financially destitute because you exploited their labor in order to maximize profits. This historical detail strengthens your obligation to give them $100.

Second, and relatedly, historical considerations are relevant to assessing the priority of competing demands of justice. Suppose there is a second family, identical to the one above in every respect except that you are not at fault for their misfortune. If forward-looking considerations overdetermined the obligations of justice, there would be no grounds for prioritizing the first family over the second family. Perhaps you would be permitted to flip a coin to determine who should receive the $100. Intuitively, however, you are obligated to prioritize the first family, and your historic transgressions are part of the explanation.

These considerations put pressure on additional way of disambiguating the redundancy thesis:

Redundancy of priority-setting thesis: For any competing demands of justice, Q1 and Q2, appeals to forward-looking egalitarian considerations are sufficient to establish which demand has normative priority. Forward looking egalitarian justice overdetermines the priority of demands of justice.

This is implausible. Q1 may very well take priority over Q2 for the simple reason that Q1 is backed by backward-looking considerations whereas Q2 is not.

Finally, as Megan Blomfield argues, backward-looking considerations might be normatively relevant with respect to determining the way redress should occur. To pick one example, consider the question of liability. Who should make redress for an injury or misfortune? It seems like we can sometimes settle that question by appealing to facts about who is blameworthy. I, rather than society more generally, ought to pay for the family’s rectification, given that I am blameworthy for their misfortune. Therefore, backward-looking considerations can have independent normative significance in virtue of settling questions of liability. Hence, it is false that:

Redundancy of duty assignment thesis: For any injustice, IN, appeals to forward-looking egalitarian considerations are sufficient to establish which persons or entities are the principal duty-bearers for redressing IN. Forward looking egalitarian justice overdetermines liability and duty assignment.

Additionally, many argue that benefiting from past wrongs generates special remedial obligations. Suppose there are two people, each lacking an eye. Person1 lacks an eye because it was stolen from them. Person2 lacks an eye as a result of mere misfortune. They are equally worse off as a result. Later in life I receive an eye transplant. I now have two good eyes. However, my new eye was Person1’s stolen eye. In fact, the eye was stolen from Person1 precisely because the wrongdoer believed, for racist reasons, that I am more deserving of two eyes than Person1. There are egalitarian reasons to assist both victims. However, my connection to Person1 gives me a stronger reason to compensate them as opposed to Person2. Hence, historic connections between injustice and the benefits of injustice may help us answer questions about who ought to redress certain injuries (in addition to offering additional strength to our obligations).

In response, one might argue that it is not the benefiting-connection that generates a special duty to repair Person1’s situation. Rather, is simply the fact that Person1 was a victim of racist injustice. Perhaps we have stronger obligations to rectify the injury of injustice, as compared to the injury of mere misfortune. This would still undermine the redundancy thesis (by undermining the Redundancy of priority-setting thesis), but I think there is a way to salvage the benefiting view. To test the claim that injustice explains the normative significance of my duty to offer redress to Person1 over Person2, suppose Person1 and Person2 both lose an eye as a result of separate racist injustices. Each eye is given to a different person. The wrongdoer in Person1’s case is a Bolivian supremacist, so they gave the eye to me. They wanted me, a Bolivian, to benefit from this injustice. The wrongdoer in Person2’s case is a Canadian supremacist, so they gave the eye to a Canadian. I have strong reasons to resist all forms of supremacist injustice, and I may have a prima facie duty to help redress the injustice against Person2. However, as an intended beneficiary of the racist wrong against Person1, I have have stronger reasons to redress their injury (all else equal).⁵

In response, it might be argued that all Bolivians have similarly strong duties to redress the injustice against Person1, whether or not they benefit. That is, it isn’t the benefiting connection that explains my stronger reason to redress Person1. It is simply the fact that Person1 endured an injustice intended to signal the supremacy of Bolivians. Hence, any Bolivian, beneficiary or not, has a similarly strong remedial duties to Person1 (all else equal). It would be odd, however, if my Bolivian sister had an equally strong duty to redress Person2 as I do. What explains the difference? A good explanation appeals to the fact that I, but not my sister, benefitted from the injustice against Person2.

In sum, the redundancy thesis is true only if these corollary theses are true. They are not true. Therefore…

1. Megan Blomfield, “Reparation and Egalitarianism.”

2. Many of these thoughts are similar to ones found in Blomfield’s paper (see footnote 1).

3. For example, see Wenar, “Reparations for the Future.”

4. Worse, backward-looking considerations might ground conflicting duties. See Wenar.

5. Tom Parr’s paper, “The Moral Taintedness of Benefiting from Injustice,” offers a really nice theory about why this is.